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Abstract
The use of formal methods for analyzing and synthesizing a controller for a multi-
train multi-track railway system is discussed. The research was motivated by a
case study involving the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system. The overall goal
is to design a train acceleration control function that enables trains to be safely
placed but also increases system throughput. The use of a modeling language
for specifying safety properties and a control function is illustrated. The program
transformation methodology supported in the HATS system is employed to generate
an eÆcient implementation from a high-level specication of a controller. This
implementation can then be used to simulate the controller behavior, thus further
enhancing condence in the design. Properties of optimization transformations
can be veried using an rewrite-rule based induction theorem prover Rewrite Rule
Laboratory (RRL).
1 Introduction and Motivation
An overview of the use of formal methods and program transformation method-
ology in analyzing and synthesizing a controller for a multi-train multi-track
system is presented. This research was motivated by a case study involving
the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system [10]. The overall objective of
the BART case study, briey discussed in the next section, is to develop train
(acceleration) control functions, enabling trains to be safely spaced closer to-
gether, thereby increasing the systems throughput. Our main objective has
been the development of a suitable model, allowing the formal denition of
safety properties required by such a system, and to then reason about the
behavior of train models with respect to these properties.
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The paper is organized in the following way. After giving an overview of
the BART system, the formal model and the modeling language are discussed;
more details can be found in [5]. Two key constructs, proles and constraints
are introduced. A prole is a sequence of tuples, where each tuple consists of
position element and an associated speed element. A constraint builds on the
concept of a prole, by using the elements in the prole to dene a satisability
region in the position-speed plane. Trains, tracks, stations and signals can be
all modeled using proles, and their related safety properties can be modeled
by corresponding constraints. A train prole is indexed by a global time clock.
The behavior of a train is governed by the behavior of the train ahead of it on
the track. Proles are discussed in discrete as well as continuous terms with
respect to position and speed. Discrete proles are necessary because that is
how data is obtained from sensors. Continuous proles are introduced for two
reasons: (i) the physical train system is continuous, and (ii) thus, most safety
properties can be directly stated in terms of constraints based on continuous
proles. This is followed by a discussion of mappings between discrete and
continuous proles. Assumptions made for dening these mappings and their
justication vis a vis safety properties are discussed. Section 4 discusses the
design of a controller algorithm. A specication of the control function is
given. This specication is then transformed to an eÆcient implementation
using HATS, a program transformation system being developed by the High
Integrity Software (HIS) program at Sandia National Laboratories. A brief
overview of HATS is given in Section 5. Some of the features of the system
are illustrated by discussing an optimizing transformation used on the spec-
ication of the controller. Section 6 is on the validation of the model using
a combination of automated reasoning tools and simulation. A rewrite-rule
based induction theorem prover Rewrite Rule Laboratory (RRL) [4] was used
for verifying the correctness of optimizing transformations used to generate an
eÆcient implementation from a specication; Simulation was used to enhance
condence in the design by executing dierent scenarios.
It should be mentioned that most of the discussion in this extended ab-
stract is informal because of space limitations; an interested reader can get
more details including the formal denitions, precise statements of theorems
and properties as well as proofs by consulting [13].
2 Overview of BART
BART provides heavy commuter rail service in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Typically over 50 trains, most consisting of 10 cars, are in service. Cars are
driven by electric motors powered by a 1000 VDC, \third rail", and use both
regenerative and friction brakes. The system is controlled automatically, and
on-board operators have a limited role in normal operations (e.g., they signal
the system when the platforms are clear so a train can depart a station, and
perhaps, in some exceptional circumstanaces, they pull the emergency brake).
With a few minor exceptions, the BART system consists of double track:
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one track going one direction and one track going the other (i.e., the track is
not a loop.) An acceleration controller is at the front and back of each train.
At the end of the line, the front and back controllers are redened, and the
train goes in the other direction.
To serve more passengers, BART needs to utilize certain sections of the
track more eÆciently. Adding new tracks to these sections, e.g., a tube under
the bay and underground in the heart of San Francisco, would be prohibitively
expensive. Because of these considerations, a decision has been made to ad-
dress the throughput problem by spacing the trains closer together.
2.1 Interlocking
Another major aspect of train control is interlocking - the management of
track switches and associated signals for entering track segments. At BART,
interlocking is handled by a system separate from the train (acceleration)
control. The train controller will simply see \go" or \stop" indicators at
various track locations, and should enter a \gate" only if allowed. It is the
responsibility of the interlocking system not to move a switch if a signal change
occurs when it is too late for an approaching train to stop. Stopping at a
station platform is much like stopping in front of a gate, although there are
some additional controls to assure the nal stop is at the precise location.
3 Formal Model
We dene a multi-track, multi-train system as a system consisting of one or
more trains sharing non-overlapping tracks. Trains must run on tracks subject
to certain constraints, such as stopping at designated stations and signals when
appropriate. We develop a model of a single train running on a single track.
Using compositionality, the model easily extends to multiple trains on a single
track as well as to multiple tracks. Therefore, it suÆces to consider a given
train (called the object train) henceforth, and analyze its behavior relative to
the train ahead of it on the track (called the lead train).
Though this model is an approximation of an actual train system, it never-
theless captures the salient features of the train such as how quickly the train
can change from one acceleration to another as well as acceleration limits.
These values can be determined from the current speed and acceleration of
the train. By capturing this kind of information, the model reects the phys-
ical limits that are encountered with respect to the movement of large heavy
objects driven by electric motors, such as trains.
The sense/react cycle time also reects these limits due to the fact that
using a particular train technology implies a certain granularity in the control
of the train. Similarly, the maximum speeds for track segments together with
a set of safety constraints directly inuence how long a train can go unsuper-
vised and hence also constrain the duration of the sense/react cycle. For our
analysis, discrete global clock time is measured in this unit; for simulation, it
is assumed to be a
1
2
second interval.
The following events are dened to be disastrous.
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(i) A train collides with another train.
(ii) A train fails to halt for a signal or station.
(iii) A train exceeds the track speed limit (risks derailment).
(iv) A train unnecessarily performs an emergency stop. Note however, that
we will consider it to be acceptable for a train to perform an emergency
stop in response to abnormal environmental conditions (e.g., derailment
of the train immediately in front of the train).
It is assumed that sensors, describing the state of a train, are correct within
certain known margins of error, acceleration commands are correctly realized
by the motor, etc.; under these assumptions, events (i), (iii), and (iv) can be
avoided by a correct control function. Event (ii) can be avoided assuming
signals are set by the interlocking system at appropriate times.
The following assumptions are made about train behavior:

A train cannot stop instantaneously; instead, the train takes time and dis-
tance to stop based on its speed and acceleration. Derailment of the lead
train can however take place instantaneously in time and position (see dis-
cussion below about conservative assumptions of the model).

Acceleration values must be \ramped up/down" over time.

Limited assumptions can be made regarding the behavior of a lead train
(e.g., it may derail).
Given the train speed, s, and current acceleration, acc, a function,N A(s; acc),
listing possible acceleration values in the next time cycle based on the physical
model of the train is assumed to exist (see [10] for a detailed explanation of
such a function).
3.1 Proles
Two constructs, proles and constraints, model the components in the train
system. A prole describes a relation between position and speed, where
position and speed are indexed by discrete (continuous) time for a discrete
(continuous) prole. We assume that there is a global clock, shared by all
trains, signals and stations on a given track. Given a time t and train i, the
prole of the i
th
train gives its position and speed at time t. Proles can be
used to model discrete/continuous trajectories in the position-speed plane.
Components in the train system are modeled as follows:

train state - A train state consists of a position, speed, acceleration triple.

train behavior - A sequence of train states whose position is monotonically
increasing. States in a behavior sequence are indexed by discrete time, and
thus describe the state of a train at a specic point in time.

discrete train prole - A discrete train prole is a sequence of position-speed
tuples, and is obtained from a train behaivor by dropping the acceleration
argument from the behavior's train states. Elements of a discrete train
prole are indexed by discrete time.
4
ATMOS 2001 { D. Kapur, V. Winter, and R. Berg

continuous train prole - A continuous train prole is a set of position-
speed-time triples, in which position, speed, and time are continuous over
a bounded range of values.
4

track prole - The track is modeled as a sequence of position-speed tuples
that is monotonically increasing on position, specifying the position on the
track where the corresponding speed limit goes into eect. This speed limit
extends up to the position of the next track segment tuple. We assume track
segments have constant speed limits associated with them and therefore are
invariant over time. This time-invariance allows us to compare discrete train
proles with track proles in a meaningful way.

traÆc-signals prole and station-signals prole - These are modeled by se-
quences of position-speed tuples in which the speed associated with a po-
sition can uctuate over time. For example, if a signal is green, the speed
at the position of the signal is the maximum speed allowed on that track
segment; if the signal is red, the speed at the position of the signal is 0.
There are similar constraints for station signals. Within the model, it is as-
sumed that the train interlocking system will operate appropriately, avoid-
ing changing a signal in case a train is so close to the signal that it may not
be able to obey the changed signal without using an emergency stop.

continuous component prole - A continuous component prole is a set
of position speed tuples that results when either a track prole, traÆc-
signals prole, or station-signals prole is used as the basis for constructing
a continuous prole. In these types of continuous proles, position and
speed values are continuous and bounded over a range of values.
3.2 Safety: A Continuous Property
Because sensor outputs are measured at discrete time intervals, the compo-
nents of the train system can be most directly modeled using discrete proles.
We are now faced with the task of formally dening various safety properties
with respect to this model. The problem here is that safety properties are
continuous properties that describe the behavior of the physical train system,
and not the discrete view induced by the sense/react loop.
Safety properties could be dened indirectly by stating relationships be-
tween various discrete proles. One must then infer from a given set of discrete
relationships that the continuous property holds. For example, consider one
of the easiest safety properties, SP, a train should not exceed the speed limit
of the track segment on which it is traveling. A rst attempt at stating this
property in terms of our discrete model might result in the following:
Let track = <(seg pos
1
; seg speed
1
);    ; (seg pos
n
; seg speed
n
) >
denote a (discrete) track prole, and train
i
= <(p
1
; s
1
);    ; (p
m
; s
m
)> denote
the prole of an object train i.
4
We could have kept a continuous train prole as a position-speed tuple indexed by con-
tinuous time, much like a discrete prole.
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Speed
Position
track segments
train behavior
safety violation
Fig. 1. Violation of Track Speed Limit
safe speed(train; track)
def
= 8(1  j < n ^ 1  t  m) :
track[j] = (seg pos
1
; seg speed
1
)^ track[j +1] = (seg pos
2
; seg speed
2
)^
train
i
[t] = (p; s) ^ (seg pos
1
 p < seg pos
2
)! s  seg speed
1
:
The question here is whether safe speed(train; track), SP? As the con-
tinuous diagram shows, the predicate does not cover all the cases.
The safe speed predicate given above can be extended to cover the case
shown, but the question still remains: \Have all the cases been covered"? In
a continuous framework, safety properties such as this can be directly stated.
Assuming that the initial state of the object train satises the track segment
speed limit, its behavior prole satises the constraints imposed by the track
segment speed limit i there does not exist a point in the position-speed
plane belonging to both the continuous representation of the track and train
behavior prole (i.e., an intersection does not occur).
Given the elegance with which safety properties can be stated in a con-
tinuous framework, we extend our model into this framework by dening a
mapping to translate discrete proles into continuous proles and vice versa.
This mapping makes explicit, a conservative understanding of what occurs in
the gaps that exist between adjacent discrete points in our model (see Section
3.3), and it is with respect to this understanding that we formally dene safety
through the satises constraint operator  as discussed in Section 3.5.
3.3 Continuous Train Proles
The sensor information provided by the system gives us a precise (within a
given margin of error) description of the state of a train at discrete
1
2
second
intervals. How should one model behavior between these discrete points? The
problem is that the continuous behavior of trains between these discrete points
falls outside of the resolution of our model. We address this model limitation
by stating properties that continuous train proles must satisfy in order to be
consistent with the discrete sensor readings provided by the system, thus, in
eect bounding such behaviors.
Let tp =< (p
1
; s
1
);    ; (p
n
; s
n
) > denote a discrete prole corresponding to
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a train behavior from (discrete) time t = 1;    ; n. Let ctp denote a continuous
train prole f(p; s; t) j t 2 [1;   n]g; note that the third component in the
triple is time ranging over a continuous time line between 1 and n.
consistent(ctp; tp) , 8(p; s; t
1
) 2 ctp; t
2
2 f1; 2; :::; ng : (t
1
= t
2
^ tp[t
2
] =
(p
1
; s
1
) ! p = p
1
^ s = s
1
) ^ (t
2
< n ^ t
2
< t
1
< t
2
+ 1 ^ tp[t
2
] = (p
1
; s
1
) ^
tp[t
2
+ 1] = (p
2
; s
2
)! (p
1
< p < p
2
^min(s
1
; s
2
)  s  max(s
1
; s
2
)).
Denition 3.1 CP
tp
= fctp j consistent(ctp; tp)g.
For a given discrete train prole, tp, CP
tp
bounds the type of continuous
proles which an actual train may have while still producing sensor readings
that are consistent with tp.
3.4 Continuous Component Proles
Let pf denote a (discrete) track, signal, or station prole whose ordering of
tuples is strictly monotonic on position with respect to the  relation. The
continuous component prole, ccp, corresponding to pf is dened as:
ccp
pf
= f(p; s) j 9k : pf [k] = (p
1
; s
1
) ^ pf [k + 1] = (p
2
; s
2
)^
[(p
1
 p < p
2
^ s = s
1
) _ (p = p
2
^ (s
1
 s
2
! s
1
 s  s
2
)^
(s
2
< s
1
! s
2
 s  s
1
)]g.
Denition 3.2 CP
pf
= fccp
pf
g.
3.5 Constraints on Proles
A constraint CP
<
denes a satisable region with respect to a given set CP of
continuous proles. A satises constraint operator  denes the conditions
under which a continuous prole relates to a constraint. Here we show the
more general case where the set CP of continuous proles is derived from a
discrete train prole. The track and signals cases are essentially the same,
except that the time component is not present in the tuples, and is ignored
while making comparisons; the relation  below is overloaded in this sense.
Denition 3.3 CP
<
def
= f(p; s; t) j 8ctp 2 CP ; (p; s
1
; t) 2 ctp : 0  s < s
1
g.
Denition 3.4 ctp CP
<
, 8(p; s; t) 2 ctp : (p; s; t) 2 CP
<
_
:9s
0
: (p; s
0
; t) 2 C
<
.
Given discrete proles for an object train OT and its lead train LT , the
continuous stopping prole of OT is computed by its controller under dierent
scenarios: (i) LT stops normally, (ii) LT makes an emergency stop, and (iii)
LT derails. Each scenario maps to a formal constraint which must be satised
by any acceleration proposed by the OT controller.
Another constraint is induced by the track segment speed limit, which
denes the maximum speed a train can safely travel on that segment. This
safety requirement is stated as: (ctp  CP
trp
), where ctp is any continuous
prole in CP
tp
, the set of continuous proles consistent with a discrete train
prole tp of OT , and CP
track
is the set of continuous proles associated with
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a discrete track prole trp. Similarly, safety properties originating from other
components of the system can be formally stated.
Safety constraints can thus be specied in a compositional manner in terms
of the safety property of trains running on each track because of the assump-
tion that tracks do not interact/interfere with each other. The safety property
of trains on a single track can be expressed in terms of the safety train of
each object train running on the track. This property is specied, again in a
compositional manner, in terms of the behavioral constraints imposed by the
associated lead train, track, signals and stations.
As discussed in [5], the domain language consists of a hierarchy of con-
structs and denitions tied together by theorems characterizing their proper-
ties. This hierarchy is based on primitive constructs and operations dealing
with enumerable sets and sequences. Giving these primitive constructs formal
operational denitions, implies that the specications written in this domain
language are executable. However, generally speaking, the computation se-
quences dened by such specications will typically be very ineÆcient.
The main reason for designing a special-purpose modeling language was
to develop a high-level abstract specication which can be transformed using
the transformations supported by the HATS system which we have been de-
veloping over a number of years. This approach has the distinct advantage
of quickly generating a running implementation for simulation purposes to
validate assumptions and debug the model. We are unaware of any modeling
language for reactive systems (e.g. [8]) which can be used to quickly generate
a prototype implementation from a high level specication.
4 Design and Specication of a Safe Control Function
Below, we give a formal denition of the safe state predicate, SS. This predi-
cate consists of the conjunction of four safety constraints. A state of an object
train is safe i there exists at least one acceleration that allows it to simultane-
ously satisfy each constraint. Constraint expressions are not computable from
the primitive constructs in our domain language. However, using theorems
that equivalently dene these comparisons in terms of discrete computations,
we have developed transformations to produce an executable specication.
From the perspective of an object train, the slower it moves the safer it
is; if the object train is safe with respect to a continous stopping prole that
is maximum among all possible continuous proles consistent with its given
discrete stopping prole, that is a conservative approximation. In contrast, the
faster the lead train moves, the less likely that the object train will collide with
it. Thus, minimum among all continuous proles consistent with a discrete
stopping prole of the lead train is a conservative approximation.
Denition 4.1 maximum(CP)
def
= ctp
1
: ctp
1
2 CP^[8(p; s; t) 2 ctp
1
; 8ctp
2
2
CP; 8(p
1
; s
1
; t
1
) 2 ctp
2
: (p = p
1
^ t = t
1
)! s  s
1
]
Denition 4.2 minimum(CP)
def
= ctp
1
': ctp
1
2 CP ^ [8(p; s; t) 2 ctp
1
;
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8ctp
2
2 CP ; 8(p
1
; s
1
; t
1
) 2 ctp
2
: (p = p
1
^ t = t
1
)! s  s
1
]
In the above denitions, if CP is a set of continuous proles consistent with
a given discrete train prole tp, thenmaximum(CP) andminimum(CP) exist.
Let OT and LT be discrete proles, respectively, of an object train and
its lead train. Given a discrete normal stopping prole nsot of an object train
in state OT [t], it is safe to assume the continuous normal stopping prole,
cp
nsot
, of the object train to be maximum(CP
nsot
), as in reality, the continu-
ous normal stopping prole will be based on the object train moving slower.
Similarly, it can be safely assumed that the continuous normal stopping pro-
le, cp
slt
, corresponding to a stopping prole slt of the lead train in state LT [t]
be minimum(CP
slt
), as in reality, the continuous normal stopping prole will
be based on the lead train moving faster. Maximum and minimum continuous
normal stopping train proles are, thus, conservative proles with respect to
the observed stopping behaviors of the object and lead trains.
Let C1
<
and C2
<
be constraints based respectively on the track prole and
signals prole. Let espot denote the continuous train prole corresponding
to the emergency stopping prole of the object train. Let C3
<
and C4
<
be
constraints due to the continuous normal stopping prole cp
slt
of the lead
train, and the continuous prole corresponding to a derail of the lead train.
SS(OT [t]; LT [t]; track; signals)
def
= cp
nsot
 C1
<
^ cp
nsot
 C2
<
^
cp
nsot
 C3
<
^ espot C4
<
.
The denition below states that safe transitions, ST , are transitions from
one safe state to another safe state or a transition to an emergency stop in
the case where the initial state is not safe.
ST (OT [t]; OT [t+ 1]; LT [t]; track; signals)
def
=
[SS(OT [t]; LT [t]; track; signals)! SS(OT [t+ 1]; LT [t+ 1]; track; signals)] ^
[:SS(OT [t]; LT [t]; track; signals)! is type(a
0
) = emergency stop].
An arbitrary control function is safe i it only makes safe transitions.
SafeController(Control)
def
=
8(OT;LT; t; track; signals) : ST( OT [t],OT [t+ 1], LT [t ],track,signals),
where the acceleration a
0
= Control(OT;LT; track; signals) is used to compute
OT [t+ 1] from OT [t].
Control(OT; LT; track; signals) =
select( [N A(s; a) : b: ST( OT [t],OT [t+ 1], LT [t]; track; signals)])
where OT [t] = (p; s; a) and OT [t+ 1] = (p
0
; s
0
; a
0
) and p
0
= p+ s. Here the
speed and acceleration are given in
1
2
units.
The function Control for the object train is safe if it only selects accelera-
tions that result in safe transitions (ST ). N A(s; a) denotes the set of possible
next accelerations for a train with current speed s and current acceleration
a. The colon operator is a lter function (discussed further in Section 5.1)
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that when given a set, S, and predicate, P, will return the subset of S whose
elements satisfy P. For details, see [13].
4.1 Correctness of Formal Model
The continuous view of the system allows safe behaviors to be formally stated
in a direct and concise manner. Above, we specied a control function that
rst generates the set of all accelerations leading to controllably safe behaviors,
and then selects the maximum acceleration from the set. We would like to
point out that other accelerations could be selected, such as an acceleration
that minimizes oscillation, but such considerations are beyond the scope of
our present study.
The following two theorems serve as the basis to obtain a provably correct
implementation from the given specication. These theorems relate (safety)
constraints expressed in a continuous domain to their discrete counterparts.
Using these theorems, it is possible to transform the specication to an algo-
rithm that can be computed in a framework based on nite enumerated sets.
The proofs for both of these theorems can be found in [13].
Theorem 4.3 If OT
0
= maximum(CP
OT
), where OT is a discrete prole
of an object train, and B
0
= CP
B
, where B is a discrete component prole
describing a track or signal conguration, then
OT
0
 B
0
<
, (8j; t : OT [t] = (p
1
; s
1
)^OT [t+ 1] = (p
2
; s
2
) ^B[j] = (p
3
; s
3
)^
p
1
 p
3
 p
2
! (max(s
1
; s
2
) < s
3
))) ^
(8j; t : OT [t] = (p
1
; s
1
) ^ OT [t+ 1] = (p
2
; s
2
) ^B[j] = (p
3
; s
3
) ^
B[j + 1] = (p
4
; s
4
)^ p
3
 p
1
 p
4
! (max(s
1
; s
2
) < s
3
))).
Theorem 4.4 If OT
0
= maximum(CP
OT
) and LT
0
= fminimum(CP
LT
)g,
where OT and LT are, respectively, discrete proles of an object train and its
lead train, OT
0
 LT
0
<
, (8t : OT [t] = (p
1
; s
1
) ^ LT [t] = (p
2
; s
2
)^ p
1
< p
2
).
5 HATS: A Program Transformation System
HATS is a transformation system developed within the High Integrity Software
(HIS) program at Sandia National Laboratories. It is freely available an can
be downloaded from http://www.sandia.gov/ast/downloads.html.
In HATS, program transformation is realized though an extended form of
term rewriting. It is a language independent system where rewriting takes
place within a wide spectrum language that is dened by a context-free gram-
mar, which forms the basis of interpreting program \strings" as terms. An
abstract prettyprinter is used to translate terms back into strings.
HATS has been specically designed for rewriting in non-conuent, non-
terminating systems, such as those that are typically encountered in software
development. This emphasis is reected by a special purpose transformation
language that enables sophisticated match conditions as well as transforma-
tional control to be expressed. One distinguishing feature of the HATS pro-
gram transformation language is that unication is an explict operation, and
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transform functions are parameterized by the terms they transform. This pa-
rameterization permits the arguments to unication expressions to be calls to
other transform functions (including recursive calls). This allows for a very
sophisticated control over the application of transformations.
To date, HATS has been used to implement:

An optimizer for a special class of reactive systems (of which the Production
Cell [7] is a member).

A unit resolution propositional theorem prover. Mainly, this was an exper-
iment to test the capabilities of the control paradigm supported in HATS.

Martell-Montannari's unication algorithm for a set of equations.

A transformation-based class loader that generates an executable ROM im-
age from a Java class le hierarchy, performing the symbolic resolution of
the constant pool entries, link editing, and loading of each class le in the
hierarchy. The class loader output will be a ROM image in a format compat-
ible with PROM programmers (e.g.,Motorola S Records), and will support
the architecture of the Sandia Secure Processor.
5.1 Example: An Optimizing Transformation
In the domain language, there is an operation denoted by the colon symbol
which we refer to as lter. Let S denote an enumerated set and let P denote a
predicate on the elements of S, then the expression [S : P] denotes the subset
of S whose elements satisfy P.
Consider the expression: [S : P] 6= ;, which can be used to dene the 9
operator. If lter is simply treated as a library function then [S : P] will have
to be evaluated rst followed by a comparison with the empty set. This eval-
uation sequence can be ineÆcient when S is large. However, a new function,
nonempty, can be created by distributing the comparison with the empty set
over the operational denition of lter. This results in the following:
lter(S,P) = if P(rst(S)) then frst(S)g [ lter(rest(S), P) else lter(rest(S),P));
nonempty(S,P) = if S = ; then ; 6= ; else if P(rst(S))
then (f rst(S) g [ rest(S;P)) 6= ; else nonempty(rest(S;P))
The above denition of nonempty can be simplied further:
nonempty(S,P) = if S = ; then false else
if P(rst(S)) then true else nonempty(rest(S;P)).
This enables the following context-dependent optimization:
[S : P] 6= ; v nonempty(S,P).
For a correctness proof of the optimizing transformation using RRL, see [11].
6 Implementation, Simulation, and Validation
We have discussed above a formal model of a train system, assumptions about
the model, a high-level specication of the controller satisfying certain safety
criteria while maximizing throughput, and a set of optimizing transforma-
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tions to obtain an eÆcient implementation from the high-level specication of
the controller. In order to gain condence in the process of designing a safe
controller, a combination of techniques were employed. This included
(i) proving theorems about relationship between the continuous model and
the discrete model to conrm that our intuition had been captured;
(ii) using an automated reasoning tool RRL [4] to prove properties such as
optimizing transformations to generate an eÆcient implementation from
a high-level specication is correct;
(iii) developing a simulation of the model using the eÆcient implementation
of the controller to develop additional condence in the design by trying
dierent scenarios using the simulation.
Regarding (ii) above, one such optimizing transformation was discussed
in the previous subsection. Its semantic correctness as well as the correct-
ness of other general-purpose transformations used to optimize the high-level
specication of the controller are discussed in [11].
Developing a formal model and evaluating dierent trade-os (e.g., whether
only discrete proles be used and safety properties be expressed using discrete
proles, how to map discrete proles into continuous proles) involved numer-
ous trial and errors. A variety of tools are necessary in the design phase for
analyzing such complex systems.
6.1 Optimizing Transformations Lead to a Substantial Speedup
Sim Steps
1
2
sec: Track Seg. S
0
0
S
n
10 100 3.938 0.344
100 100 40.218 4.578
200 100 64.719 8.078
... ... ... ...
500 100 154.203 16.906
Track Seg. S
0
0
S
n
300 24.84 0.734
300 252.41 8.5
300 401.375 14.312
... ... ...
300 963.782 37.953
An executable implementation of the high-level specication of the ab-
stract controller algorithm was obtained in the HATS system by providing
an operational semantics of the simple base functions used in the modeling
language. The executable specication obtained was too slow to meet the
real-time requirements of the system. Optimizing transformations were then
applied to generate an eÆcient implementation.
Many general as well as domain and problem specic optimizations have
been identied. However, only a few have been implemented. The optimiza-
tions that we did implement, dramatically reduced the running time of the
implementation as the results in the above table indicate. The substantial
speed-up enabled us to quickly try many dierent scenarios to enhance our
condence in the design of the controller.
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6.2 Gaining Condence via Simulation and Graphic Display
The design of the controller has been guided by the constraint imposed on the
behavior of a train by its lead train on the track. During the design phase,
a major concern arose whether the system throughput was severely aected
because of a overly conservative view taken above about the behavior of an
object train and its lead train for calculating stopping proles. I.e., if there are
many trains on the track, consecutive trains in a sequence would travel slower
and slower, with the last train not moving at all or perhaps moving very slowly.
While such a property could be, in principle, be formally stated and checked
using reasoning tools, it would have required a considerable eort. Simulation
can be very helpful in such cases, especially when there are doubts about
certain aspects of the design, and it is unclear whether substantial resources
should be invested in developing a rigorous correctness analysis.
With an eÆcient implementation available, we quickly added a few addi-
tional transformations, allowing us to synthesize a collection of control func-
tions for a sequence of 10 trains (it was very easy to change the number of
trains running on a single track; we started with a few trains and kept on
increasing their number until we felt we had a realistic model).
In order to observe the behavior of a train system, we hand-coded a simu-
lation environment. Since the property being investigated was not going to be
aected by the presence of traÆc signals or stations, they were not included
in the simulation. This environment generated a track consisting of track seg-
ments with associated speed limits together with an initial conguration for
the trains in the system. The control function for each train computed the
optimal acceleration for the next time interval. This acceleration was returned
to the simulator which applied it to the corresponding train. The trains in the
system were then advanced, for a
1
2
second interval, according to the motion
formulas given in the BART case study document, generating a new system
state which was in turn fed back to the control functions. Typical sample
simulation runs would create a track of a few hundred miles and would run
the trains over the length of the track.
A vector of position and speed tuples for each train in the train system
was generated; such a vector was checked to assure that they satised the
following basic safety properties: (1) no train was exceeding its track speed
limit, and (2) the k
th
train was positionally behind (k + 1)
th
train.
The numerical output produced a list of vectors of numbers which often
made little sense. Certain patterns of numbers would appear to be intuitively
wrong (e.g., (k + 1)
th
train speeding up whereas k
th
train slowing down). To
verify that the simulation was indeed correct, would lead us to time-consuming
manual analysis, only to reveal that the behavior was indeed consistent with
the system specication. After a few of such calculations, a more eective way
to view and analyze the data being produced was needed.
An obvious solution was to display the output of the simulation in graphical
terms. The output was displayed in relative terms with respect to position
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Fig. 2. Graphical Animation of 10 Trains
(i.e., the position on the x-axis where the lead train is located remains xed
at the right side of the display), and the position of the remaining trains is
displayed relative to the xed position of the lead train. The speed of trains
varies along the y-axis. In the animation shown, trains were represented by a
blue triangle shape, and the set of trains were connected by a thin blue line.
This line was added to help visualize the speed variations among the trains.
Track speed limits were displayed by green squares, and were also connected
by a thin green line in order to better view the relationship between train
behaviors and track speed limits. Each train \triangle" was matched with a
speed limit \square" in a relative manner. Thus, the green squares are always
located directly above their corresponding triangle.
Such an animation leads to an increased condence in the design since the
behavior of the trains is intuitively correct. To stress the control function
further, we implemented a random control function to control the lead train
in the system. This function would cause the lead train to randomly speed
up or slow down while staying within the track speed limit. The other trains
in the system, those controlled by our formally developed control functions,
caused the system to display a behavior that is most closely described by a
kite tail uttering in the wind, where the knots in the tail correspond to the
triangles in the simulation. This behavior is pleasing to observe, and it is easy
to informally and casually convince oneself that it is correct.
From a formal verication standpoint, such a validation via simulation
is unnecessary if the underlying models are correct and no mistakes have
been made in the formal development. However, the information gained from
observing the simulation enhances the designer's condence that the train
behaviors and the models that they are based on seem correct with respect to
the perspective provided by the simulation. Further, properties which can take
considerable eort to formally disprove, can be done easily using a simulation
by developing a scenario. The use of a variety of tools, including reasoning
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tools, testing and simulation, for gaining condence in design and its validation
cannot be over-emphasized.
Model checking can be viewed as a possible alternative to simulation for de-
bugging a formal model, especially when the system behavior can be expressed
in terms of discrete states. However, the number of states to be considerd may
explode in case of 10 trains running on a single long track as well as with hun-
dreds of simulation steps. For handling continuous properties, it is unclear,
however, how model checking would have helped.
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